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What Drives U.S. Immigration Policy? 
Evidence from Congressional Roll Call Votes
* 
 
Immigration is one of the most hotly debated policy issues in the United States today. Despite 
marked divergence of opinions within political parties, several important immigration reforms 
were introduced in the post 1965 era. The purpose of this paper is to systematically analyze 
the drivers of congressional voting behavior on immigration policy during the period 1970-
2006, and in particular, to assess the role of economic factors at the district level. Our 
findings provide robust evidence that representatives of more skilled labor abundant 
constituencies are more likely to support an open immigration policy concerning unskilled 
labor. Thus, a simple factor-proportions-analysis model provides useful insights regarding the 
policy making process on one of the most controversial facets of globalization. 
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(TOM)”. 1. Introduction 
Immigration and immigration policy have been at the forefront of the U.S. policy debate ever 
since independence (Hatton and Williamson 2005). Recent evidence suggests that public 
views on immigration continue to diverge greatly (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Hanson et al. 
2007, Mayda 2006). Even within political parties, heterogeneous opinions co-exist. For 
example, Watanabe and Becerra (2006) report that, “The Republican Party is split among 
those who want tougher restrictions, those who fear alienating the Latino vote and business 
owners who are pressing for more laborers to fill blue collar jobs in construction, cleaning, 
gardening and other industries.” In the usually pro-immigration Democratic Party, labor union 
constituents are concerned about foreign worker inflows.
1  
Despite controversy, a series of important immigration policy measures were enacted in the 
post 1965 era. In this paper, we use legislation on unskilled immigration introduced between 
1970 and 2006 to systematically analyze the determinants of the voting behavior of U.S. 
House Representatives on immigration. We focus on the economic drivers of the voting 
decision, particularly the labor market characteristics of a constituency. To frame our analysis, 
we start with a simple theoretical model in which heterogeneous districts differ in their 
relative endowments of skilled and unskilled labor. By changing factor supplies, immigration 
affects factor income, thus creating winners and losers.
2 An elected politician supports an 
immigration policy initiative if it increases his/her constituency’s voters well being, and the 
model shows that he/she is more likely to favor an open immigration policy towards unskilled 
immigrants the more skilled labor abundant is his/her district.  
We test our model’s predictions using a novel dataset covering roll call votes on immigration 
policy, which potentially affected the supply of unskilled immigrants. We focus on the U.S. 
House of Representatives over the period 1970-2006. We match votes to a wealth of district 
level characteristics, both economic and non-economic in nature.  
Our empirical analysis suggests that labor market characteristics are statistically significant 
drivers of a representative’s voting behavior on immigration policy. In particular, we find 
that, consistently with the model’s predictions, representatives from more skilled labor 
                                                 
1 See Watts (2002). 
2 See Berry and Soligo (1969). Empirical evidence on the effect of immigration on wages is more controversial. 
In particular, Borjas (2003, 2006) finds robust evidence on the adverse effect of immigration on native workers’ 
wages, whereas Card (2009), and Ottaviano and Peri (2008), among others, find a much smaller, and often 
insignificant, effect.  
  2abundant districts are more likely to support an open immigration policy towards the 
unskilled. In terms of magnitude, the effects are considerable; our benchmark specification 
suggests that an 1 percentage point increase in the share of skilled individuals leads to an 
approximately 1.5 percentage point increase in the probability that the district representative 
will support a bill liberalizing unskilled immigration. 
In addition to districts’ labor market characteristics, the literature has suggested that other 
factors influence voting behavior. Thus, to assess the robustness of our findings, we explore 
the role played by a constituency’s other economic characteristics, political/ideological 
drivers, and ethnic features. While we find that several of these channels do matter, our main 
results are unaffected. The expected labor market impact of foreign workers is a robust driver 
of decision making on immigration policy matters. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the most comprehensive attempt to date to 
systematically investigate the drivers of immigration policy voting behavior in the post 1965 
era. It is also the only one that directly exploits differences in factor endowments across 
districts to capture the extent of expected labor market competition brought about by the 
inflow of unskilled foreign workers.  
The congressional politics of immigration policy has been the subject of an array of previous 
studies. Gimpel and Edwards (1999) analyze in their comprehensive study a variety of 
individual bills, but pay little or no attention to district level economic determinants. In 
contrast, Goldin’s (1994) study of the introduction of the literacy test provision is a pioneering 
contribution in the economics literature. Several other papers in this tradition focus on a single 
piece of legislation or a narrow set of legislative initiatives. For instance, Gonzalez and 
Kamdar (2000) analyze the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act (H.R. 2202) and find that representatives of districts characterized by a higher share of 
workers employed in low-skill intensive industries tend to favor immigration restrictions. 
Fetzer (2006) found a similar result in his analysis of voting on H.R. 4437 during the 109
th 
Congress, looking at the distribution of individuals across occupations in a given district.
3 
Banaian et al. (2006) - following a similar approach - consider four important bills introduced 
between 1980 and 1996, and focus on the role played by sectoral employment in shaping 
voting behavior. Besides covering a larger sample of votes, our analysis has the advantage of 
                                                 
3 He finds that support for the bill overwhelmingly came from representatives of districts characterized by a high 
share of blue collar workers.  
  3considering a direct measure of the educational achievement at the district level, which is less 
sensitive to short run changes in immigration policy at the national level. 
An interesting, recent study by Milner and Tingley (2009) comes closest to ours in scope. The 
authors analyze a large panel of votes on immigration policy related issues that took place in 
the U.S. Congress between 1979 and 2006, and explore the role of both economic and non-
economic drivers of individual representatives’ choices. Importantly, their analysis differs 
from ours in several respects, both in terms of data and methodology. First, our sample covers 
a longer time period. Second, Milner and Tingley (2009) include all votes on migration, 
whether they be final or intermediate votes.
4 They also include immigration bills that were 
not expected to directly affect the labor supply in the United States. Our focus is narrower. 
We consider only those bills that – according to the literature – would have a direct impact on 
the domestic labor supply. We also examine exclusively final passage bills, as the expected 
district level effects of floor amendments are less clear than for final passage votes. With this 
narrower focus, we considerably tighten the causal link between labor supply conditions in a 
district and the voting behavior of that district’s elected representative. By including in their 
sample immigration bills that do not necessarily have an impact on the district’s factor 
supply,
5 Milner and Tingley (2009) find only limited support for the role played by the labor 
market channel in shaping voting behavior.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the recent 
developments in the congressional history of U.S. immigration policy. Section 3 presents a 
simple theoretical model, which drives our empirical investigation. Section 4 describes our 
data, while section 5 presents our empirical results. In section 6 we carry out a series of 
robustness checks, and section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. A short overview of recent U.S. Migration Policy 
Immigration to the United States soared  between 1970 and 2006, and has been shaped by the 
introduction of the thirteen bills covered in our study (see Table 1). 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 abolished the national-origin quota system and 
replaced it with a framework emphasizing the importance of family ties. This new policy 
environment lead to a substantial increase in the flow of immigrants. Following the first oil 
crisis, Congress become more restrictive, approving in 1973 H.R. 392 and H.R. 891. The first 
                                                 
4 Typically, this involves floor amendments, etc. 
5 See also the discussion in Section 4. 
  4bill provided for employer sanctions to tackle the growing employment of undocumented 
immigrants. The second extended instead the applicability of the 20,000 per-country cap to 
migrants from the Western Hemisphere.
6 This measure was designed to limit immigration 
from Mexico (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).  
With growing numbers of refugees, much of the policy debate during the eighties focused on 
illegal immigration and asylum seekers. While we exclude refugee bills from our analysis,
7 
we include those on illegal immigration. The two most important initiatives in this respect are 
the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill (H.R. 1510), introduced in 1982, and the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (H.R. 3810, “IRCA”) of 1986. The two measures are closely intertwined, since 
the latter is a revised version of the former. The first major provision of the Simpson-Mazzoli 
Bill was the prohibition of knowingly hiring or recruiting undocumented immigrants, 
imposing financial and other penalties for employing illegal aliens. The second major 
provision required employers to verify their employees' immigration status. Finally, the 
legislation granted amnesty to certain seasonal agricultural workers and illegal immigrants. 
The bill was very controversial, and although it passed the House in a very close vote in 1984, 
it never become law in its original form. A new version, the eventual IRCA, was introduced in 
both chambers of the 99
th congress. Its main innovation was the addition of a temporary 
program for agricultural workers. The new bill became law on November 6, 1986. The 
direction of the IRCA’s policy change from the status quo is not straightforward to assess. 
However, two of its features stand out. First, it allowed the legalization of almost 3.5 million 
illegal immigrants as permanent residents (LeMay 2006). Second, it implemented a 
controversial guest-worker initiative in the tradition of the Bracero program, which enabled a 
temporary inflow of unskilled farm workers. For these reasons, and following Tichenor 
(1994), we classified the IRCA as pro-immigration. In keeping with the literature, we 
classified instead the Simpson-Mazzoli bill as anti-immigration, since its provisions sought 
much more clearly to restrict immigration.
8 The third measure introduced in the eighties was 
H.R. 4222, which extended the legalization provisions of the IRCA by six months.
9 
                                                 
6 The Immigration Act of 1965 imposed per-country ceilings for immigrants from Eastern Hemisphere nations. 
The overall caps are 120,000 for Western Hemisphere nations (North, and South America) and 170,000 for 
Eastern Hemisphere nations (Africa, Asia, Europe and Australia). 
7 Refugees and asylum seekers usually do not gain immediate access to the host country’s labor market. 
Furthermore, “warm glow” is likely to play an important role in shaping the voting behavior on policy measures 
towards refugees and asylum seekers (see Hatton 2004, Hatton and Williamson 2006). 
8 We have also verified that all our results are robust to the exclusion of the IRCA bill from our sample. The 
findings are available from the authors upon request. 
9 Originally the amnesty program was scheduled to run from May 1987 to May 1988. 
  5Differently from IRCA, the first major piece of legislation of the nineties, the Immigration Act 
of 1990 (“IMMACT”) focused on legal immigration. It had two main goals: the revision of the 
existing visa allocation system and the introduction of new provisions for skilled immigration. 
To this end, the IMMACT created a “diversity” category, which was meant to represent 
approximately 6% of new immigrants. Furthermore, it increased the annual cap for legal 
permanent residents from approximately 500,000 to 675,000. Finally, the act established a 
short-term amnesty program to grant legal residence to up to 165,000 spouses and minor 
children of immigrants, who became legal residents under the IRCA.  
The IRCA failed to stem the problem of undocumented immigrants entering the U.S.. To 
address this concern, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (H.R. 
2202) was introduced in 1996. Besides increasing the size of the U.S. Border Patrol, the bill 
mandated the construction of a fence along the most heavily trafficked areas of the U.S.-
Mexico border. Furthermore, it designated a pilot program to check the job applicant’s 
immigration status. The act also made the deportation of illegal immigrants substantially 
easier. Importantly, it restricted access to federal and state benefits to all immigrants, legal or 
illegal.  
At the end of the 1990’s, as a result of the high tech boom, public pressure rose to increase the 
number of highly skilled foreign workers to be admitted. The Temporary Access to Skilled 
Workers and H1-B Nonimmigrant Program Improvement Act of 1998 (H.R. 3736), approved 
by the House on September 24, 1998, temporarily increased the annual cap for H1-B visas.  
In the last years of our sample, the events on September 11, 2001 and the consequent fear of 
additional terrorist attacks have provided powerful catalysts for a series of measures aimed at 
reducing illegal immigration and tightening immigration law enforcement (H.R. 418, H.R. 
4437, H.R. 6061, H.R. 6094, and H.R. 6095). The most controversial and substantial of these 
initiatives was the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 
2005 (H.R. 4437). Its major provisions were the creation of a U.S.-Mexico border fence up to 
700 miles long and federal custody of locally detained undocumented aliens. Furthermore, the 
bill imposed a fine of $3,000 on all undocumented aliens captured in the U.S., who had 
previously agreed to leave the country voluntarily. It also provided for up to five years 
imprisonment for any person supporting or hosting undocumented immigrants (Fetzer 2006). 
The bill was highly controversial and, while it passed the House of Representatives, it did not 
clear the Senate. As a result, it is the only major immigration act in our sample that did not 
become public law. 
  63. Theoretical framework 
To analyze the drivers of the voting behavior of individual representatives, we consider a 
simple model with D heterogeneous districts. Each district is populated by low skilled and 
high skilled individuals and each agent respectively supplies one unit of either unskilled (L) or 
skilled (H) labor. District i is populated by  low skilled agents and   high skilled ones, 
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N      1 , respectively, the share of low and high skilled in the domestic 
population.  
Districts are heterogeneous with respect to their skill mix. Each of them produces one output 
good, Y, according to the same, constant returns to scale production technology, Y=F(H,L), 
which can be expressed in intensive units as y=f(h), where y=Y/L, h=H/L etc. The production 
function is well behaved, with f’(h)>0, f’’(h)<0. Perfect competition in factor markets insures 
that the equilibrium rate of return to human capital, r, is given by r=f’(h), while the wage rate 
is given by w=f(h)-hf’(h). In this simple setting, individuals care only about their income.  
The preferences of native individuals residing in the district are represented by the local 
congressperson. In choosing whether to support an immigration policy, the representative 
maximizes the utility level of the average worker.
11 Thus, his/her objective function can be 
written as  
      h r h w W Li Li      1    (1) 
Two alternative policy options are available: maintaining the status quo, or adopting a 
measure that will change the skill mix in the population. This simple setting captures the main 
features of our data, from which we have information on whether a congressperson votes in 
favor or against a policy that increases the relative supply of unskilled labor.  
The main result of our model can be summarized by: 
                                                 
10 Note that in our model, we assume that the number of firm owners in the population is negligible, and thus 
their well-being does not enter the welfare function maximized by the representative. Of course, firms might 
play an important role in shaping migration policy outcomes through their lobbying activities. We address this 
issue in our empirical analysis. 
11 The choice of this objective function can be rationalized in a probabilistic voting setting in which two 
candidates compete for the seat in Congress and do not know the true preferences of the median voter. For more 
on this issue, see Drazen (2000). 
  7Proposition 1 The likelihood that a representative will support a more open migration policy 
towards the more (less) skilled is increasing in the share of the low (highly) skilled in the 
district’s population.  
Proof: From equation (1) and the factor market equilibrium conditions, we know 
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, which establishes the result.   ⁭  
As long as the relative weight attached to skilled labor in the objective function of the 







increase (decrease) in the skilled labor supply is viewed favorably (negatively) by the 
politician. Across jurisdictions, a district with a higher share of low (highly) skilled in the 
population is more (less) likely to favor an inflow of skilled immigrants. In other words, our 
model suggests that the complementarity (and substitutability) between a district’s factor 
endowment and the expected labor market effect of immigration is an important driver of a 
congressperson’s voting behavior. The mechanics of Proposition 1 are illustrated in Figure 1, 










Figure 1: Skilled and unskilled abundant districts 
  84. Data and summary statistics 
Our data come from various sources. We start with the Congressional Roll Call Voting 
Dataset of the Policy Agenda Project and the THOMAS database maintained by the Library 
of Congress. The two sources contain a comprehensive register of the votes in the U.S. House 
of Representatives. We used them to identify and collect information on the immigration 
related initiatives introduced between 1970 and 2006. Our analysis focuses on bills with 
recorded roll call votes, as these enable us to precisely observe the individual behavior of 
House Representatives.
12 Since both databases provide only summary information about the 
content of bills, we supplemented them using additional resources, like the Congressional 
Quarterly, the roll call dataset maintained by Rohde (2010) and existing historical accounts 
like the one by Gimpel and Edwards (1999). We then use the full text of the legislation to 
classify the immigration bills into four categories: general immigration, illegal migration, 
refugees and asylum, and naturalization and integration. We restrict our analysis to bills 
belonging to the first two categories, because they are most directly linked to the inflow of 
foreign labor.  
Moreover, we consider only initiatives with a potential impact on the supply of unskilled 
labor.
13 In particular, for our purposes, an immigration bill is a measure that has a direct 
(positive or negative) impact on the size of the unskilled labor force in the U.S.. Therefore, we 
exclude, for instance, measures that provide public goods to illegal migrants or federal 
reimbursement of health and education costs to states. Finally, we focus on final passage 
votes, which determine whether a bill passes the House. In doing so, we exclude votes on 
amendments and other intermediate procedural steps.
14 We have decided to follow this 
strategy because the expectations on the effects of floor amendments are less clear cut than for 
final passage votes. Voting on amendments is often strategic and is therefore less likely to 
distinctly reflect the interests of the legislator’s constituency.
15 Narrowing the data according 
                                                 
12 Besides recorded votes, two additional types of votes take place in the House. The first is “voice voting,” 
which is usually employed when a question is introduced on the floor. By this method, members of Congress 
who are in favor of the bill or amendment shout in unison “Aye”, followed by those voting “No”. In the case of 
standing or division voting, the principle is the same, except that the representatives who are in favor will rise 
and stand until counted instead of shouting. In both cases only the vote totals are announced, and no individual 
member’s vote is recorded. Individual votes are recorded if this is required by at least one-fifth of the members 
present, or if this is demanded by one member in the case that no quorum exists (Davis 2006). The request for 
recorded votes is typically a sign for lack of consensus and indicates the presence of a controversial decision 
process (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). 
13 The only exception is specification 4 in Table 6, where we include the votes on the only bill affecting the 
supply of skilled foreign workers, i.e. H.R. 3736 of 1998.  
14 For a comprehensive overview of the legislative process on the House floor, see Davis (2006).  
15 For example, amendments can be used to kill bills on the floor. A well-known example in the political science 
literature is the “Powell Amendment” of 1956. It referred to a House bill which was meant to increase federal 
  9to these criteria results in the House bills enumerated in Table 1. Most of the votes are 
relatively close, reflecting the controversial nature of immigration policy in the United States.  
We next match our bill information to individual House voting data from VOTEVIEW (Poole 
and Rosenthal 1997). The VOTEVIEW database contains variables, such as the House 
Representative’s name, party affiliation, and state and congressional districts, that enable us to 
uniquely identify the legislators and link them to their constituency. Finally, we match 
individual voting data to Census data on the economic and non economic characteristics of 
electoral constituencies.
16  
Our dependent variable is the voting behavior of district’s i representative on an immigration 
bill j at time t (Voteijt). Almost all of our analysis focuses on bills affecting the supply of 
unskilled immigrants. In the case of bills liberalizing unskilled immigration a vote is coded 1 
if the district’s representative supports more open immigration and 0 otherwise. In the case of 
legislations restricting unskilled immigration a vote is coded 0 if the representative supports 
restricting immigration and 1 otherwise. Finally, in the case of the bill H.R. 3736 from 1998, a 
vote coded 0 indicates support for increasing the supply of skilled migrants, whereas a vote 
coded 1 indicates opposition to this policy.
17  
The main explanatory variable of interest in our analysis is a district’s skill ratio, SkillRatioit. 
We measure this variable with the ratio of high-skilled individuals in the population over 25 
years of age at time t in congressional district i. High-skilled individuals are defined as those 
having earned at least a bachelor degree. Based on our theoretical model, the district’s skill 
endowments and expected changes in the labor supply from immigration should shape voting 
behavior. In particular, we expect that the likelihood to vote in favor of liberalizing the 
immigration of unskilled workers increases with the share of the highly skilled population at 
working age.  
                                                                                                                                                          
funding for school construction. The Powell Amendment proposed that funding should only be given to school 
districts that were free of racial segregation. Empirical evidence suggests that legislators anticipated that the 
adoption of the amendment would lead to a rejection of the related aid-to-education bill. The voting behavior of 
the legislators on the Powell amendment was therefore strongly influenced by strategic interests (Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997). 
16 To this end, we use data from the Congressional District Data Files of Adler (2003) and Lublin (1997), who 
aggregated Census data at the congressional district level, taking into account decennial redistricting. We 
supplement this data also with information taken directly from the US Census Congressional district files. 
17 Our model suggests that a representative’s vote is driven by the expected effect of the bill on a district’s 
relative skill supply. Thus, an increase in the supply of skilled workers is equivalent to a decrease in the supply 
of unskilled workers.  
  10We also control for unemployment and the share of farm workers, which proxies for the size 
of the agricultural sector. Moreover, we account for the industrial structure of a district by 
including the share of individuals employed in manufacturing, construction and wholesale and 
retail. To capture welfare state influences, we use two variables: median family income, and 
the ratio of average to median family income, which measures the extent of inequality within 
the district.  
The ideological orientation of a representative is captured by party affiliation, whereas to 
measure the district’s orientation, we use the share of Democratic votes in the last 
congressional election.
18 
The role of immigrant networks and additional ethnic characteristics of the district is analyzed 
using the share of foreign-born and the shares of African-Americans and Hispanics in the 
population. To account for the possibility that recent immigrants might affect representatives’ 
preferences differently from existing immigrants, we use instead the change in the share of 
foreign born. 
Finally, we explore how geography shapes voting on immigration policy. To this end, we 
include the share of the population living in urban areas, capturing potential attitudinal 
differences between rural and urban areas. We further investigate state differences by running 
separate regressions for representatives from South-Western and high immigration states.
19 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables described above. Two points are worth 
highlighting. First, over the entire observation period, 36% of the representatives voted for 
bills increasing the relative supply of unskilled workers. However, there are important 
differences over time. While almost 41% of the district representatives supported this type of 
measures up to 1990, the average thereafter declined substantially to about 32%. Second, the 
data on the skill composition of the resident population suggests that in our sample, on 
average, almost one out of every five Americans over 25 holds at least a bachelor’s degree. 
This rather high figure is in part due to the fact that out of the thirteen bills included in our 
study, five have been introduced during the 109
th congress, i.e. between 2005 and 2006.
20  
                                                 
18 Data on share of Democratic votes comes from Lee et al. (2004) and for the 109th Congress from Chandler et 
al. (2008). 
19 See the notes to Table 6 for the exact definitions. 
20 Educational attainment in the US has substantially increased over our sample period. Between 1970 and 2000, 
the population share over 25 with at least a bachelor’s degree climbed from 10.7% to 24.4% (Bauman and Graf 
2003).  
  11Both the skill ratio and voting behavior on immigration exhibit strong variation across 
congressional districts. The main goal of our paper is to investigate whether a systematic 
relationship exists between a representative’s voting behavior on immigration and the relative 
skill composition of his/her home district. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this point. Focusing on 
the congressional districts of New York State, Figure 2 plots the votes cast on the anti-
immigration  Border Protection, Anti-terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act (H.R. 
4437) introduced during the 109
th congress. In Figure 3, we use Census data to construct the 
district level share of highly skilled in the population. The large majority of the legislators 
who supported a less restrictive immigration policy came from districts with skill ratios above 
average.
21 However, the figure also shows that not all representatives from districts with high 
skill ratios voted in favor of a liberal immigration policy. This highlights the necessity to 
systematically control for additional district characteristics. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
As the theoretical model suggests, a representative’s vote on an immigration bill is a function 
of the district’s skill composition. In particular, we expect labor market complementarities to 
play a key role. Thus, in districts with relatively more skilled labor, representatives should 
favor liberalizing unskilled migration. To assess this theoretical prediction, we estimate the 
following probit model: 
  s t s t it it it it I I I I X Skill Z Vote prob         2 1 ) | 1 (    (2) 
where   is a dichotomous variable taking a value of one if a representative of district i 
votes for a bill liberalizing unskilled immigration at time t, Φ(.) represents the cumulative 
distribution function of a standard normal,   is the share of the population over 25 years 
of age with at least a bachelor’s degree,  is a vector of additional explanatory variables 




  is the vector of parameters to be estimated. Furthermore, we 
include time (It ) and state fixed effects (Is) to account for unobserved time- and state-specific 
effects.
22 We also allow the effects of state-specific unobserved shocks to vary over time 
using a full set of two-way interactions (It x Is). In order to simplify the interpretation of our 
results, all our tables report marginal effects. Thus, our estimates capture the change in the 
probability of voting in favor of a more open immigration policy due to an infinitesimal 
                                                 
21 During the 109
th Congress, 24% on average of a district’s population was skilled. 
22 We use state rather than district fixed effects. The use of district fixed effects over a long time horizon is 
problematic since the geographic definition of congressional districts changes following each decennial census.  
  12change in each independent, continuous variable, and a discrete change in the probability for 
dichotomous variables. 
Table 3 contains our main specifications. Our first regression (column 1) focuses on economic 
drivers that work through the labor market. As predicted by our theoretical model, we find 
that labor market complementarities are important. Representatives from districts with a 
higher relative share of skilled workers are more likely to support immigration policies aimed 
at increasing the supply of unskilled workers. This finding is robust to the inclusion of 
additional district level controls. Furthermore, we find a positive relationship between a 
district’s unemployment rate and voting on liberalizing low-skilled immigration. This result, 
which is counterintuitive but common in the literature (see for instance Gimpel and Edwards 
1999), is likely due to omitted variable bias (see the discussion below). 
To control for the importance of sectoral employment, whose role, for instance, is emphasized 
by Gonzalez and Kamdar (2006), we also include the share of agricultural workers. A priori, 
the sign of the relationship between the importance of agriculture and voting behavior is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, unskilled and illegal immigrants may compete with native 
workers in agriculture (Hanson and Spilimbergo 1999, 2001). That competition points to a 
negative relationship. On the other hand, if agriculture is important in a given district, 
agricultural interest groups may convince politicians of the need for an abundant labor supply. 
This line of reasoning points to a positive relationship. Our results do not favor one direction 
or the other. We find that the share of farm workers is negatively related with the likelihood to 
vote in favor of immigration liberalization, but this result, as we discuss later on, is not robust.  
In the second regression (column 2), we examine the role of the welfare state. An abundant 
literature highlights the welfare state’s importance in shaping individual-level attitudes 
towards immigration (Hanson et al. 2007, Dustmann and Preston 2007, Facchini and Mayda 
2009). We expect this channel to play an important role in our analysis as well. In particular, 
we expect legislators from wealthier constituencies to exhibit less favorable attitudes towards 
unskilled immigration, as unskilled immigrants are likely to be net receivers of benefits from 
the welfare state. Economic theory (Meltzer and Richard 1981) also suggests that inequality 
within a constituency should increase redistribution by a democratic government. Thus, 
representatives of districts characterized by higher inequality should support unskilled 
  13immigration less, as the burden of poor, unskilled immigrants is likely to be larger.
23 Our 
findings are broadly consistent with these theoretical expectations. Representatives of 
wealthier districts are significantly less likely to support unskilled immigration (column 2). 
The latter result is robust to the introduction of additional controls (see columns 3-4).
24 
Representatives from districts characterized by higher inequality are also less likely to support 
unskilled immigration. This effect is greater when controlling for the share of foreign born 
(column 4).  
Next, we account for political/ideological factors (column 3 of Table 3). First, we control for 
the representative’s party affiliation. We find that Democrats are significantly more likely to 
vote in favor of immigration liberalization. This result is in line with earlier findings by 
Gimpel and Edwards (1999), who conclude that “recorded votes on immigration policy have 
become more partisan over time, even after controlling for alternative influences on 
congressional decision making such as region and constituency characteristics.”
25 Notice that 
accounting for the representative’s party affiliation substantially reduces the effect of the 
share of farm workers on the legislator’s voting behavior. This suggests that the results in 
columns 1 and 2 were driven by an omitted variable bias. Indeed, districts characterized by a 
higher employment share in agriculture tend also to be more conservative and, without 
controlling for ideology, the sectoral composition effect was confounded with the ideological 
dimension.  
Lee et al. (2004) argue that an elected representative’s party affiliation is an imprecise proxy 
for a district’s partisan leaning. Consequently, in column 3 we also control for the extent of 
party strength in the previous congressional election. Our results show that districts with a 
higher share of Democratic votes in the last election are more likely to support legislation 
liberalizing immigration, but the effect is not statistically significant.  
In the fourth and last specification of Table 3 we look at geographic and network factors. It is 
well known that migrants tend to concentrate in urban areas (Card 2009). Thus, we explore 
whether representatives from urban districts vote differently from those from rural districts. 
Our results show that a representative from a district with more constituents in urban areas is 
                                                 
23 Note that we do not have data on the size of the welfare state at the district level. We proxy for it using the 
extent of inequality. We are doing so following Meltzer and Richard (1981). For recent empirical evidence 
supporting the predictions of this model, see Borge and Rattso (2004). 
24 Note that since we include a full set of state and year interactions in all our empirical analyses, we cannot 
separately control for the extent of redistribution carried out at the state level. 
25 The authors provide evidence that the cleavage between Republicans and Democrats has steadily increased 
since the 96th Congress (1979-80), whereas Republicans tended to oppose liberalized immigration.  
  14more likely to support liberalizing unskilled immigration. However, the effect is not 
significant. We also find that a higher share of foreign-born leads to a higher likelihood of 
voting to liberalize unskilled immigration. At least two possible explanations exist for this 
result: social and family networks, and identification with minorities. First, freer immigration 
helps relatives and friends of existing immigrants enter the U.S.; this channel has been found 
to be very important in the labor market (Munshi 2003). Second, existing immigrants identify 
with new immigrants due to their own immigration experience.  
To account for the effects of immigration spikes over time we also control for the growth rate 
in the share of foreign born (Money 1997). We find that recent spikes in the share of foreign 
born negatively affect the probability of voting for immigration liberalization, although the 
results are not statistically significant. Finally, we assess the role played by the racial 
composition of the district, focusing on the share of Hispanics and African-Americans. We 
find no significant effect for the former, whereas we do find a positive and significant effect 
(at the ten percent level) for the latter.
26 Evidence suggests that African-American legislators 
tend to see the immigration issue within a minority rights framework. Based on the ideas of 
civil rights and equal opportunity, they build political coalitions with other ethnic minorities 
and tend to support open immigration policies (Gimpel and Edwards 1999, Gonzalez and 
Kamdar 2000, Fetzer 2006). Controlling for the share of African-Americans in the population 
makes the unemployment rate statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This result 
suggests that an omitted variable bias might affect our initial specifications. African-
Americans are more likely to be unemployed, and representatives of districts with a high 
share of African-Americans are more likely to support open immigration policies.
27 
To summarize, the findings in Table 3 provide strong support for our theoretical model’s 
predictions. Our benchmark analysis (column 4 in Table 3) not only suggests that the district’s 
skill mix significantly affects the voting behavior of an elected representative, but that the 
effect is substantial. In particular, a one percent increase in the share of highly skilled 
individuals in a district is associated with a 1.46 percent higher probability of voting for 
liberalizing unskilled immigration.  
 
                                                 
26 The insignificance of the coefficient for Hispanics might be driven by the small size of the Hispanic 
population during the early congressional sessions. 
27 Indeed, we also run a specification identical to the one reported in column 4, from which we excluded the 
unemployment share, and the coefficient on African-American is positive and strongly significant. The results 
are available upon request from the authors. 
  156. Additional results 
In this section we assess the robustness of our empirical analysis. We start in Table 4 by 
considering alternative measures of a district’s economic characteristics. In column 1, we 
replace the share of high skilled individuals with the share of low skilled individuals, 
Alternative SkillRatio. Analogous to SkillRatio, we define Alternative SkillRatio as the share 
of individuals who did not complete high school. Our results are in line with the model’s 
predictions. A district’s representative is less likely to vote for liberalizing unskilled 
immigration when lower skilled individuals make up a larger share of the population. The 
results for the impact of other district characteristics are similar to the ones in our preferred 
specification (column 4 of Table 3).  
In column 2, we use an alternative definition of a district’s skill composition that is based on 
occupation rather than educational attainment.
28  SkillRatio Occupation is the share of 
individuals over 16 employed in executive, administrative, managerial and professional 
occupations. We find that voting for liberalizing unskilled immigration is more likely when a 
district has a higher share of workers in these occupations. Thus, our model’s predictions are 
supported also with this alternative measure.
29 
In column 3, we further explore the role played by sectoral employment. In particular, we 
modify our benchmark specification (column 4 in Table 3) by controlling for the share of 
employment in manufacturing and in a combined category of construction and retail. The sign 
and significance of SkillRatio is unaffected. Our results indicate that representatives from 
districts with more manufacturing are less likely to vote for liberalizing unskilled 
immigration. In contrast, the coefficient of construction and retail exhibits a negative sign. 
However, the two effects are not statistically significant.
30  
Up to this point, we have controlled for the ideology of a legislator by using his/her party 
affiliation.
31 The latter is only a proxy for the congressperson’s true views. Moreover, 
legislators are characterized by a number of other individual characteristics that we cannot 
observe. Some of these unobservable features may be related to the skill composition of a 
                                                 
28 This definition is in line with Milner and Tingley (2009). 
29 This result is not surprising given that the correlation between SkillRatio and SkillRatio Occupation is 0.93.  
30 In an additional specification (available upon request) we used political action committee contributions by 
corporations and labor unions to assess whether lobbying activity affects voting behavior on immigration 
legislation. We did not find the contributions to play a role and, more importantly, including these additional 
controls does not affect the sign and significance of our main result. 
31 Our results are similar if we use alternative measures of ideology from the political science literature like DW-
NOMINATE or ADA scores. 
  16district. For example, liberal legislators may be more likely to represent high skill labor 
abundant districts. For this reason, in Table 5 we estimate our benchmark specification, 
adding individual legislator fixed effects. By doing so, we control for unobservable 
characteristics of the representative which are invariant to time. We therefore exploit the 
variation in the district skill composition to estimate whether the same representative changes 
his/her support for unskilled immigration when the district’s skill composition varies over 
time.  
Due to the incidental parameter problem, we cannot run a probit estimation with individual 
level fixed effects. Since all the results reported in the paper are marginal effects, for 
comparison purposes Table 5 contains estimates from a linear probability model, but we have 
also used a conditional logit specification, obtaining similar results.
32 Importantly, the sign 
and significance of our key explanatory variables are not affected. This finding strongly 
suggest the existence of a causal link between districts’ skill composition and representatives’ 
voting behavior. 
In Table 6, we check for robustness with respect to the geography of immigration and changes 
in the sample size. In column 1, we limit our bill sample to the four major immigration 
reforms introduced during the period (H.R.3810,  H.R.2202,  H.R.4300, and H.R.4437).  In 
column 2, we restrict our sample to districts from the Sunbelt states, which are characterized 
by strong population growth during the period we are considering. In column 3, we focus on 
states with large inflows of immigrants.
33 Our main results are unaffected by any of these 
sample limitations. The coefficient of SkillRatio remains positive and significant in each of 
these alternative specifications. 
Rather than limiting our sample, in column 4, we extend it by including legislation aimed at 
changing skilled immigration. As discussed in Section 4, H.R. 3736 of 1998 is the only bill on 
skilled immigration introduced in our sample period, for which roll call votes are available. 
The measure temporarily increased the annual quota for H1-B visas. A vote in favor of this 
bill has been coded as a “0,” whereas a vote against it as “1.” Including this measure in our 
sample does not affect our main findings.  
 
                                                 
32 The coefficient estimate for the share of skilled in the population is 20.06, and it is significant at the one 
percent level. 
33 The 15 states with the highest share of foreign-born in the population during our observation period. 
  177. Conclusions 
The making of immigration policy is one of the most controversial and divisive issues in the 
United States today. Ideology, race and ethnic considerations feature prominently in much of 
the debate, both among the broader public and elected representatives. Individual level 
economic attributes have been shown to play an important role in shaping attitudes towards 
immigration. In this paper, we analyze instead the role played by economic determinants at 
the district level in influencing the voting behavior of elected representatives.  
To carry out our analysis, we have developed a simple theoretical model that emphasizes the 
importance of the skill composition of a constituency. Our framework predicts that legislators 
are more likely to favor a policy increasing unskilled immigration, if skilled labor is more 
abundant in their district.  
We have empirically assessed these predictions using a new dataset, which includes all U.S. 
House of Representatives roll call votes on immigration policy over the period 1970-2006. 
We have found that labor market factors, as captured by the complementarity /substitutability 
between the domestic and foreign labor forces, are key drivers of a legislator’s voting 
behavior. In particular, representatives of skilled labor abundant constituencies are 
systematically more likely to vote for liberalizing unskilled immigration, whereas congress 
members from more unskilled labor abundant districts are less likely to do so. These effects 
hold both when we compare representatives across districts, as well as when we consider the 
same congressperson over time. 
Our analysis has accounted also for many of the other economic and non economic 
determinants of voting behavior, which have been emphasized in the existing literature. While 
we find some of them to play a significant role, the skill mix of the constituency is a 
remarkably robust driver of the immigration voting decision. This evidence suggests that a 
simple factor-proportions-analysis model can provide important insights on policy making in 
one of the most controversial aspects of the globalization process.  
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  20Table 1: Final passage votes on immigration issues in the House of Representatives 
1970-2006 
   Cong  Date  Bill  Topic  Keyword  Direction  Yes  No  Sum 




Contra  297  63  360 
2  93  26.9.1973  H.R.891  Immigration Rodino bill  Contra  336  30  366 




Contra  216  211  427 






Pro  230  166  396 
5  100  21.4.1988  H.R.4222  Illegal 
Immigration
Extension of 
legalization by 6 
months 
Pro  213  201  414 
6  101  3.10.1990  H.R.4300*  Immigration The 1990 
Immigration Act 
(IMMACT) 
Pro  227  192  419 






Contra  333  87  420 
8  109  10.2.2005  H.R.418  Illegal 
Immigration
Real ID Act  Contra  261  161  422 






Contra  239  182  421 
10  109  14.9.2006  H.R.6061  Illegal 
Immigration
Secure Fence Act  Contra  283  138  421 
11  109  21.9.2006  H.R.6094  Illegal 
Immigration
Community 
Protection Act of 
2006 
Contra  328  95  423 
12  109  21.9.2006  H.R.6095  Illegal 
Immigration
Immigration Law 
Enforcement Act of 
2006 
Contra  277  140  417 
Total number of individual roll call votes on unskilled immigration legislation:  4,906




Pro  288  133  421 
Total number of individual roll call votes on immigration legislation:  5,327
 
Cong and Date describe the congress/date in which/when the vote took place. Bill shows the name under which 
the bill is originating in the House of Representatives ("H.R."). Major immigration legislations are marked with 
an asterisk (*). Topic classifies the broad issue of the bill. Keyword provides some basic information about the 
content of the legislation. Direction shows whether the bill is pro or contra liberalizing immigration. Yes/No 
show the overall number of Yes/No Votes. Sum shows the overall number of votes. All figures are calculated on 
the basis of individual voting records. 
  21Table 2: Summary statistics  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Vote ijt  5327  0.36  0.48  0  1 
SkillRatio it  5323  0.19  0.09  0.02  0.57 
Alternative SkillRatio it  5323  0.29  0.13  0.04  0.75 
SkillRatio Occupation it  5325  0.27  0.08  0.09  0.58 
Farm Worker it  5320  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.22 
Manufacturing it  5318  0.17  0.08  0.03  0.52 
Wholesale and Retail it  5320  0.17  0.03  0.09  0.43 
Construction it  5320  0.06  0.02  0.01  0.16 
Unemployment it  5320  0.06  0.02  0.02  0.22 
Median Family Income it  5327  33410  18411  4660  91571 
Mean Family Income it  5322  41101  24366  5939  141672 
Inequality it  5322  1.21  0.10  0.86  1.97 
Democrat it  5327  0.51  0.50  0  1 
Share Democrat Votes it  5298  0.52  0.25  0.00  1.00 
Urban it  5324  0.74  0.24  0.00  1.00 
Foreign-born it  5327  0.08  0.09  0.00  0.59 
FB growth it  5327  0.43  0.76  -0.82  6.00 
African-American it  5327  0.12  0.15  0.00  0.92 
Hispanic it  5173  0.09  0.14  0.00  0.84 
Vote jit is coded as 1 if the representative of district i at time t votes on bill j in favor of immigration, 0 otherwise. 
SkillRatio  it measures the percentage of the population over 25 with at least a bachelor degree. Alternative 
SkillRatio  it  is the percentage of the population over 25 with less than 4 years of High School. SkillRatio 
Occupation it describes the percentage of individuals over 16 employed in executive, administrative, managerial 
and professional specialty occupations. Farm Worker it measures the share of farm workers in the total labor 
force. Manufacturing  it describes the share of individuals employed in manufacturing in the total labor force. 
Wholesale and Retail it, respectively Construction  it, measure the share of people employed in wholesale and 
retail, respectively construction, in the total labor force. Unemployment it is the share of unemployed individuals 
in the total labor force. Median Family Income it measures the median family income within a district in dollars. 
Mean Family Income it measures the mean family income within a district in dollars. Inequality it describes the 
ratio between mean and median family income within a district. Democrat it is a dummy coded as 1 if the 
representative of the district belongs to the Democratic Party. Share Democrat Votes it is the Democratic share of 
the two-party vote at the past House elections. Foreign-born it is the share of foreign-born individuals in the total 
population. FB growth it measures how the share of Foreign-Born share has changed related to the previous 
period. African-American it is the share of African-American individuals in the total population. Hispanic it is the 
share of individuals with Hispanic origin in the total population. 
  22Table 3: Empirical results for all constituencies and unskilled immigration bills 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are presented 
in parentheses. All specifications include year and state fixed effects as well as state*year interactions. ** 
Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. See end of table 2 for a definition of the variables. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Vote on liberalization of unskilled immigration 
SkillRatio it  1.063**  1.759**  1.567**  1.460** 
  (0.238)  (0.328)  (0.395)  (0.294) 
Unemployment it  11.81**  9.082**  4.852**  3.054 
  (1.515)  (2.753)  (1.756)  (1.714) 
Farm Worker it  -4.888**  -5.432**  -2.029**  0.154 
  (0.841)  (1.211)  (0.602)  (0.835) 
ln(Family Income it)    -0.571**  -0.307*  -0.258* 
   (0.163)  (0.150)  (0.111) 
Inequality it    -0.00665  -0.000816  -0.366* 
   (0.243)  (0.201)  (0.156) 
Democrat it     0.396**  0.378** 
     (0.0228)  (0.0497) 
Share Dem Votes it     0.132  0.0736 
     (0.0867)  (0.0731) 
Urban it       0.140 
       (0.133) 
Foreign-born it       1.067** 
       (0.364) 
FB growth it        -0.0168 
       (0.0139) 
Hispanic it       0.275 
       (0.184) 
African-American it       0.321 
       (0.173) 
Observations  4,290  4,290  4,290  4,290 
Pseudo R-squared  0.315  0.322  0.440  0.464 
Log Likelihood  -1952  -1931  -1597  -1527 
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Table 4: Robustness checks: Economic channel 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Vote on liberalization of unskilled immigration 
SkillRatio it     1.421** 
    (0.328) 
 Alternative SkillRatio it -1.156**    
  (0.309)    
SkillRatio Occupation it   1.901**   
   (0.470)   
Unemployment it  2.783  2.513  3.093 
  (1.657)  (1.577)  (1.649) 
Farm Worker it  0.447  0.160  -0.187 
  (0.793)  (0.781)  (0.841) 
Manufacturing it     -0.340 
    (0.210) 
Constr/Ret it     0.620 
    (0.811) 
ln (Family Income it)  -0.138  -0.285  -0.237 
  (0.112)  (0.158)  (0.128) 
Inequality it  0.0632  -0.433*  -0.357* 
  (0.103)  (0.171)  (0.154) 
Democrat it  0.380**  0.377**  0.379** 
  (0.0346)  (0.0253)  (0.0366) 
Share Democrat Votes it 0.106  0.0881  0.0770 
  (0.0811)  (0.0765)  (0.0743) 
Urban it  0.100  0.124  0.0835 
  (0.129)  (0.134)  (0.148) 
Foreign-born it  1.424**  1.200**  1.109** 
  (0.313)  (0.310)  (0.327) 
FB growth it   -0.00728  -0.0123  -0.0138 
  (0.0144)  (0.0140)  (0.0138) 
Hispanic it  0.364  0.307*  0.288 
  (0.216)  (0.146)  (0.171) 
African-American it  0.434*  0.401**  0.362* 
  (0.180)  (0.153)  (0.176) 
Year Effects  yes  yes  yes 
State Effects  yes  yes  yes 
State * Year Interactions yes  yes  yes 
Observations  4,290  4,290  4,290 
Pseudo R-squared  0.463  0.465  0.465 
Log Likelihood  -1531  -1524  -1524 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are presented 
in parentheses. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. See end of table 2 for a definition of the variables. 
Notes (1) The Alternative SkillRatio it is the percentage of the population over 25 with less than 4 years of High 
School. (2) SkillRatio Occupation it describes the percentage of individuals over 16 employed in executive, 
administrative, managerial and professional specialty occupations. (3) Manufacturing  it measures the share of 
individuals employed in manufacturing  in the total labor force. Constr/Ret  it  measures the share of people 
employed in wholesale & retail and construction in the total labor force.  
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 Table 5: Legislator fixed effects 
  (1) 
Dependent Variable: Vote on liberalization of unskilled immigration 
SkillRatio it  1.784* 
  (0.746) 
Unemployment it  3.188** 
  (1.135) 
Farm Worker it  0.0575 
  (1.943) 
ln(Family Income it)  -0.427 
  (0.272) 
Inequality it  -0.175 
  (0.406) 
Democrat it  0.163** 
  (0.0605) 
Share Dem Votes it  0.303** 
  (0.0969) 
Urban it  -0.174 
  (0.184) 
Foreign-born it  0.291 
  (0.665) 
FB growth it   -0.00577 
  (0.0200) 
Hispanic it  -0.271 
  (0.634) 
African-American it  0.122 
  (0.467) 
Year Effects  yes 
State Effects  no 
State * Year Interactions  no 
Legislator fixed effects  yes 
Observations  4,290 
R-squared  0.660 
The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Robust standard 
errors, clustered by legislators, are presented in parentheses. ** Significant at 
1%, * significant at 5%. See end of table 2 for a definition of the variables. 
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Table 6: Robustness checks: Geography & sample 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 






Dependent Variable: Vote on liberalization of unskilled immigration (except (4))   
SkillRatio it  1.971*  1.504**  1.679**  1.185** 
  (0.783)  (0.258)  (0.290)  (0.296) 
Unemployment it  5.254**  -1.221  1.188  2.878* 
  (1.922)  (1.775)  (1.803)  (1.376) 
Farm Worker it  2.639  0.234  0.433  -0.494 
  (1.467)  (1.095)  (1.058)  (0.755) 
ln (Family Income it)  -0.431  -0.386**  -0.202  -0.220 
  (0.386)  (0.112)  (0.131)  (0.115) 
Inequality it  -0.796*  -0.310  -0.549**  -0.331* 
  (0.338)  (0.198)  (0.146)  (0.156) 
Democrat it  0.566**  0.426**  0.407**  0.366** 
  (0.0390)  (0.0279)  (0.0388)  (0.0316) 
Share Democrat Votes it 0.0116  0.425**  0.242*  0.0918 
  (0.155)  (0.154)  (0.103)  (0.0736) 
Urban it  0.589*  0.114  -0.0756  0.0158 
  (0.236)  (0.344)  (0.204)  (0.113) 
Foreign-born it  1.612*  0.769**  1.366**  1.044** 
  (0.655)  (0.187)  (0.374)  (0.341) 
FB growth it   -0.0579*  -0.00726  -0.0315  -0.0328* 
  (0.0277)  (0.0254)  (0.0205)  (0.0152) 
Hispanic it  -0.106  0.649**  0.604**  0.228 
  (0.380)  (0.118)  (0.121)  (0.192) 
African-American it  0.001000  0.0655  0.424**  0.360* 
  (0.375)  (0.112)  (0.158)  (0.164) 
Year effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
State effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
State * Year Interactions yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  1,422  1,144  2,322  4,649 
Pseudo R-squared  0.473  0.425  0.462  0.436 
Log Likelihood  -515.4  -453.1  -859.8  -1738 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are presented 
in parentheses. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. In column (1) we include only voting records on major 
immigration legislations (see table 1: H.R.3810, H.R.2202, H.R.4300, and H.R.4437). In column (2), we include 
only voting records of representatives from South-Western states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah). In column (3) we include only voting records of 
representatives from High immigration states (15 states with the highest share of foreign-born population: 
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Oregon, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington). Finally, in column (4) we include voting records on 
H.R.3736. 
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Figure 3: Skill ratio, New York State 109th Congress.
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